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I. Introduction
In August 2014, EA Sports, a gaming empire, released the
fifteenth version of Madden NFL, a video game that allows the
player to simulate a professional football game using avatar
versions of NFL players. 1 The Madden NFL series warrants
praise for its immense success—more than 100 million copies sold
over the last twenty-five years—and for its realism, as “[t]he NFL
superstars definitely look like their real life counterparts would.” 2
Consistent with the game’s goal to become more realistic with
each release, Madden NFL 15 boasted the new addition of one
player’s tattoos, while simultaneously adding in some legal issues
concerning copyright law. 3
1. See Becky Sullivan, For the First Time, Real Tattoos Make Their
Madden Debut, NPR (Aug. 24, 2014, 6:27 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/
08/24/342959404/for-the-first-time-real-tattoos-make-their-madden-debut (last
visited Nov. 6, 2015) (noting the release of the newest installment of the
Madden series) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See id. (recounting the enormous success of the Madden series and its
shift towards increasingly realistic depictions of NFL players); see also Nick
Bilton, Video Game Industry Continues Major Growth, Gartner Says, N.Y. TIMES
(July 5, 2011, 6:55 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/05/video-gameindustry-continues-major-growth-gartner-says (last visited Nov. 6, 2015)
(emphasizing the video game industry boom that continues to this day, making
the video game industry an important player in legal issues) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See Samit Sarkar, Why Tattoos Are Just Now Returning to Madden
with Madden NFL 15, POLYGON (June 5, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://www.polygon.
com/2014/6/5/5782540/madden-nfl-15-tattoos-returning-colin-kaepernick
(last
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During an interview with Polygon, Madden NFL’s line
producer 4 Sean Graddy confirmed that concerns about tattoos
and copyright prevented tattoos from previously appearing in the
popular video game series once it transitioned to high-definition
consoles. 5 Colin Kaepernick, quarterback for the San Francisco
49ers, remains the only player with tattoos in Madden 15, as the
process of securing licenses from Kaepernick’s tattoo artists took
“a fair amount of work.” 6 Madden’s desire to depict players’
tattoos sparked a flurry of queries regarding the legal
ramifications of including replicas of tattoos in the video game,
with freshly minted legal scholars concluding both that tattoos
deserved copyright protection and that players fundamentally
possessed autonomy over their own persons. 7
visited Nov. 6, 2015) (explaining why Madden has not previously included
players’ tattoos and how it plans to proceed in securing the necessary licensing
to include more players’ ink in future Madden games) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. See Brett McKay & Kate McKay, So You Want My Job: Video Game
Producer, ART OF MANLINESS (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.artofmanliness.com/
2010/09/29/so-you-want-my-job-video-game-producer/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2015)
(describing the tasks of a video game line producer, which include overseeing
development of a game) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. See Sarkar, supra note 3 (citing Sean Graddy as saying, “It really comes
down to a piece of art asset here that could be [copyrighted], frankly, as we’ve
learned over time”).
6. See id. (describing how Kaepernick first secured permission from his
tattoo artists before Madden would consider including his tattoos in the newly
released game); see also Darren A. Heitner & Alan Wilmot, Score a Touchdown,
Kiss Your Tattoo, and Get Sued for Copyright Infringement?, 21 JEFFREY S.
MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 299, 318–19 (2014) (recounting how an account
management representative at a sports agency company spent thousands of
hours researching and cold-calling to obtain partnerships with LeBron James
and Kobe Bryant’s tattoo artists so he could use their tattoos on merchandise);
Joseph Milord, Colin Kaepernick Will Be the Only Player in Madden 15 with
Tattoos, ELITE DAILY (June 6, 2014, 10:46 AM), http://elitedaily.com/sports/colinkaepernick-will-be-the-only-player-in-madden-15-with-tattoos/622374/
(last
visited Jan. 5, 2015) (identifying Kaepernick as the only player whose animated
avatar will include his own tattoos) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
7. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, Whose Tattoo Is It
Anyway?, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oeraustiala-tattoo-copyright-20131006-story.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2015)
(opining on the question “who owns a tattoo?” and recognizing the conflicting
rights of athletes and tattoo artists) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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The copyrightability of tattoos, however, does not just affect
the booming video game market. 8 The NFL continues to sign
multi-billion dollar contracts to broadcast its games, which also
display players’ body art. 9 Professional athletes and their tattoos
pop up everywhere: magazines frequently feature players’ barely
clad bodies, and ESPN even dedicates an entire edition of its
magazine to include images of unadorned athletes. 10 Television
networks, magazine publishers, and video game creators all need
answers regarding their legal exposure when it comes to
featuring athletes’ tattoos, but not a single court has addressed
the issue head-on. 11
This Note examines the limited and uncertain cases and
scholarship discussing tattoos and concludes that the current
precedent provides insufficient guidance in applying copyright
protection to tattoos. It addresses this lack of supervision by
analyzing the existing scholarship suggestions that justify
copyright protection for tattoos and subsequently dismisses those
suggestions in favor of an alternative and new position.

8. See Christine Lesicko, Tattoos As Visual Art: How Body Art Fits into
the Visual Artists Rights Act, 53 IDEA 39, 61 (2013) (noting that a precedential
ruling regarding the copyrightability of tattoos would affect the internet’s
plethora of tattoo art and artist resources, along with other media sources).
9. See, e.g., Kurt Badenhausen, The NFL Signs TV Deals Worth $27
Billion, FORBES (Dec. 24, 2011, 6:13 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurt
badenhausen/2011/12/14/the-nfl-signs-tv-deals-worth-26-billion/ (last visited
Nov. 6, 2015) (announcing the NFL’s nine-year extension to its broadcast
packages with Fox, NBC, and CBS, under which the networks will pay
approximately sixty percent more than previous agreements) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. See Heitner & Wilmot, supra note 6, at 299 (pointing out that, out of
the fifty-four photos in the fifth annual Body Issue, nine showcased athletes
with extensive body art); Nancy Szokan, ESPN Magazine Body Issue Shows Off
Naked Athletes, Their Muscles and Tattoos, WASH. POST (July 21, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/espn-magazine-bodyissue-shows-off-naked-athletes-their-muscles-and-tattoos/2014/07/21/719309260b76-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (“We can
also see pretty much all of running back Marshawn Lynch (impressive tattoos)
and Texas Ranger Prince Fielder (also sporting some dramatic body art as well
as a pronounced—and yet not flabby—belly) . . . .”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
11. See Yolanda M. King, The Challenges “Facing” Copyright Protection for
Tattoos, 92 OR. L. REV. 129, 129–30 (2013) (remarking on the lack of precedent
regarding the copyrightability of tattoos).
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Part II discusses the Copyright Act of 1976 12 and debates its
applicability to tattoos from a textual perspective. 13 Part III
examines the three major cases involving copyright and
tattoos—Reed v. Nike, Inc., 14 Whitmill v. Warner Brothers
Entertainment, Inc., 15 and Allen v. Electronic Arts, Inc. 16—all of
which ended in confidential settlement agreements. 17 Part IV
recounts the alternative solutions that the scholarship offers to
deal with the public policy problem of giving tattoos copyright
protection and criticizes the authorities’ approaches; it also
introduces a practical solution that the National Football
League Players Association (NFLPA) proposed but doubts its
actual practicality. 18 Part V presents this Note’s suggested
approach—denying tattoos copyright protection for all
nonfeatured uses of the artwork—and explains the rationale
and public policy supporting this novel test. 19

12. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2012).
13. Infra Part II. This Note does not venture into the First Amendment
issues surrounding tattoo artists and their clients, although courts and scholars
have addressed those questions. See, e.g., Alexa L. Nickow, Note, Getting Down
to (Tattoo) Business: Copyright Norms and Speech Protections for Tattooing, 20
MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 183, 185 (2013) (comparing the unquestioned
First Amendment protection for tattoos as symbolic speech with the reluctance
of courts to recognize the process of tattooing as speech). See generally Anderson
v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2010); Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC
v. City of N. Chi., 580 F. Supp. 2d 656 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495
F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1980); State v. White, 560 S.E.2d 420 (S.C. 2002).
14. Complaint at 1, Reed v. Nike, Inc., No. 3:05-CV-00198 (D. Or. Feb. 10,
2005) [hereinafter Nike Complaint].
15. Complaint at 1, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11CV-00752 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Warner Brothers Complaint].
16. Complaint at 1, Allen v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-03172 (W.D. La.
Dec. 31, 2012) [hereinafter Electronic Arts Complaint].
17. Infra Part III.
18. Infra Part IV.
19. Infra Part V.

1952

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1947 (2015)

II. The Copyright Act of 1976: Questioning Its Applicability to
Tattoos
A. What the Copyright Act Protects
The Copyright Act protects “original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device.” 20 The Act goes on to define “works of
authorship” more specifically, which relevantly include “pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works.” 21 Two aspects of the tattooing
process warrant analysis under the Act’s framework: the flash
design and the final inked-on-skin product. 22 The flash “is the
collection of designs for tattoos in a tattoo shop; tattoo parlors
traditionally display flash on large pieces of paper throughout the
shop for customers to select or use as inspiration.” 23 Without a
doubt, flash garners copyright protection, as it parallels works
that traditionally deserve protection under the Act, such as
paintings. 24
The copyrightability of tattoos on skin, on the other hand,
seems less certain, but scholars generally accept that tattoos
meet the requirements set forth in the Act, which explains the
lack of discourse questioning that conclusion. 25 Textually
20. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (outlining the subject
matter of copyright).
21. See id. § 102(a)(1)–(8) (listing the various categories that constitute
works of authorship).
22. See JOHN REARDON, THE COMPLETE IDIOT’S GUIDE TO GETTING A TATTOO
32 (2008) (differentiating between flash designs and tattoos inked on clients’
skin).
23. See id. (noting that flash serves dual purposes: giving clients immediate
designs to choose from and serving as good reference material for clients when
brainstorming from their own personal inspiration).
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”
to mean “two-dimensional . . . works of fine, graphic, and applied art,” including
“prints and art reproductions” and “technical drawings”).
25. See Heitner & Wilmot, supra note 6, at 305–06 (“[I]t is commonly
accepted that tattoos fall within the ambit categories that qualify for copyright
protection.”); Lauren Etter, Ink Inc.: As Tattoos Become Big Business, Tattoo
Artists Are Asserting Their Copyright Claims, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2014, at 9 (“And
now it’s increasingly clear that the law also applies to ink on skin.”); Jacob
Gershman, Athletes’ Tattoo Artists File Copyright Suits, Leaving Indelible Mark,
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speaking, if a tattoo possesses a mere modicum of originality,
qualifies as a work of authorship, and appears fixed in a tangible
medium of expression, it should obtain copyright protection
according to the elements listed in the Act. 26 Scholars mostly
agree that “copyright protection can logically be extended to
tattoos” when applying the originality, works of authorship, and
fixation requirements. 27
Despite the overwhelming scholarly consensus, some scholars
argue that tattoos fail to meet the previously mentioned
requirements in order to eliminate the problems associated with
tattoos and copyright. 28 Clearly, a tattoo inherently possesses
some amount of originality, and the law requires only a minimal
degree of creativity, making a challenge to this element of
copyrightable subject matter nearly impossible to win. 29 Tattoos
WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2014, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/athletestattoo-artists-want-more-skin-in-the-game-1402972074 (last visited Nov. 6,
2015) (“[L]awyers and scholars say there is no obvious reason why tattoo artists
shouldn’t be covered by the same rights granted to photographers or other
visual artists.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
26. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text (paraphrasing the Act’s
definition of copyrightable subject matter).
27. See David M. Cummings, Note, Creative Expression and the Human
Canvas: An Examination of Tattoos As Copyrightable Art Form, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 279, 304 (2013) (separating tattoos into two distinctive categories for
analysis of whether they can and should be copyrighted—tattoos based off of a
sketch or flash and then applied to the skin compared to tattoos originally
created on the skin). This distinction mainly addresses the problematic
characterization of human skin as a “useful article,” although courts using the
conceptual separability test resolve this dilemma without complication. Id. at
302. A “useful article” is a staple article of commerce, which a human body is
not. Id. As an analogy, the “useful article” exception means that the painting on
a canvas garners copyright protection, but the canvas itself does not. Id. The
debate regarding conceptual separability and useful articles, however, remains
ongoing. See Barton R. Keyes, Alive and Well: The (Still) Ongoing Debate
Surrounding Conceptual Separability in American Copyright Law, 69 OHIO ST.
L.J. 109, 109–10 (2008) (noting that the copyrightability of designs on useful
articles remains “one of the most confusing aspects of American copyright law”).
28. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (outlining the subject
matter of copyright under the Act); infra note 166 and accompanying text
(concluding, for public policy reasons, that the Act does not extend copyright
protection to human bodies).
29. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)
(noting that the requisite level of creativity to qualify for copyright protection is
“extremely low”). Although the argument appears very weak, some unoriginal
tattoo designs might not meet the minimal degree of creativity required, similar
to the telephone directories in Feist. See id. at 340 (“The constitutional
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also objectively qualify as works of authorship because of their
pictorial and graphic nature. 30
The only realistic challenge to whether tattoos deserve the
label of copyrightable subject matter involves their fixed nature,
and whether skin qualifies as a tangible medium of expression. 31
As skin ages, stretches, shrinks, burns, and varies pigments, a
tattoo on that changing skin morphs as well, calling into question
whether a tattoo can ever be fixed. 32 Tattoos, however, ultimately
possess a rather permanent quality and thus defeat this
argument. 33 Skin can most certainly serve as a tangible medium
of expression. 34 Therefore, challenging whether tattoos meet the
requirements for copyrightable subject matter does not
successfully answer the question of their protection.

requirement necessitates independent creation plus a modicum of creativity.”).
A common example includes an unchanged image of the American flag, which
requires no creativity from the tattoo artist whatsoever. This Note does not
address these types of tattoos. If a tattoo artist inks a “cultural heritage” or
Aboriginal design, such as a Native American symbol, that type of tattoo
escapes the categorization as copyrightable subject matter, too. See Nash v.
CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990) (“No one invents even a tiny
fraction of the ideas that make up our cultural heritage.”). These tattoos do not
receive copyright protection because the originality belongs to the associated
group. See id. (denying copyright protection for Nash’s work because he merely
analyzed history and culture but failed to add any of his own expression to the
work at issue). This Note does not address tattoos implicating cultural heritage
issues, either.
30. See supra note 21 (defining a work of authorship).
31. See infra note 164 and accompanying text (noting Nimmer’s belief that
the human body does not, and for public policy purposes cannot, qualify as a
medium of expression under the Copyright Act).
32. See Declaration of David Nimmer at 6–7, Whitmill v. Warner Bros.
Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-00752 (E.D. Mo. May 20, 2011) [hereinafter Nimmer
Declaration] (determining that if a court found that a tattoo qualified for
copyright protection under the Act, then a court could bar the wearer from
removing a tattoo or altering the original tattoo in any way, including changes
to the wearer’s skin).
33. See Olga Khazan, The Secret to a Tattoo’s Permanence: The Immune
System, THE ATLANTIC (July 22, 2014, 10:52 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
health/archive/2014/07/the-real-reason-tattoos-are-permanent/374825/
(last
visited Nov. 6, 2015) (“The dye gets lodged deep in the skin thanks to hungry
anti-inflammatory cells called macrophages.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
34. But see Nimmer Declaration, supra note 32, at 4 (concluding that Mr.
Tyson’s head could not constitute a protectable medium of expression).
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B. Tattoo Artists’ Rights Under the Copyright Act
The owner of a copyright possesses certain exclusive rights,
including the right to reproduce the copyrighted work, the right
to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work, the
right to distribute copies of the copyrighted work, and the right to
publicly display the copyrighted work. 35 The inclusion of tattoos
in Madden NFL 15 implicates all of these rights. Copying the
design of a real tattoo and placing it on a digital version of a
player in the video game constitutes a reproduction of the tattoo,
infringing on the tattoo artist’s exclusive reproduction right. 36
Selling millions of copies of the popular video game violates the
artist’s exclusive right to distribute. 37 Recreating the original
tattoo in a digital format explicitly creates a derivative version of
the original work, violating the artist’s exclusive right to all
derivative works. 38 Finally, and most controversially, whenever
35. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (listing the rights of
the author of a work copyrighted according to the Copyright Act).
36. See 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 7.2 (3d ed. 2014) (noting that
limitations on the exclusive right of reproduction generally divide between
limitations based on the type of copyrighted work involved and limitations based
on the type of use of the copyrighted work). EA Sports’ utilization of copyrighted
tattoos would invoke both of these types of violations, as pictorial types of works
garner more protection and identical copying qualifies as an extremely
reprehensible use of a copyrighted work. See id. (discussing the differences
between limitations on the right to reproduce a copyrighted work).
37. See id. § 5.5 (2d ed. 2004) (“Section 106(3) of the Copyright Act gives a
copyright owner the exclusive right to distribute, and to authorize others to
distribute, ‘copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.’”). This right
effectively envelops the important right of first publication by preventing all
forms of transfer, not just sale. See id. (describing the broad coverage of the
right to distribute the copyrighted work and emphasizing the importance of this
exclusive right to copyright holders).
38. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (defining a derivative work as “a work based upon
one or more pre-existing works,” which includes any form in which a work may
be recast, transformed, or adapted). A work is not derivative, however, unless it
has substantially copied from a prior work. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.01 (Matthew Bender rev. ed., 50th ed. 2014)
(distinguishing a new work from a derivative work). Creating a video game
version of a copyrighted work qualifies as making an infringing, derivative
work. See Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998)
(finding that Micro Star’s use of Formgen’s MAP files in its own video game with
different characters infringed on Formgen’s copyright by creating a violative,
derivative work).
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the recipient of the tattoo appears in public, he violates the
artist’s right to publicly display the copyrighted work. 39 With a
mountain of violations to support his claim, the tattoo artist’s
case appears strong to recover damages for copyright
infringement, and the cases discussed in Part III generally
agree. 40
III. (Questionable) Precedent: What the Cases Suggest
A. Reed v. Nike, Inc.
Matthew Reed, an Oregon tattoo artist, and Rasheed
Wallace, an NBA basketball player, first interacted in 1998 on a
recommendation to Wallace from a fellow athlete. 41 Wallace and
Reed met and discussed the artwork that Reed would eventually
ink onto Wallace’s arm; Wallace provided the initial idea of
incorporating an “Egyptian themed family design” into his tattoo,
while Reed relied on his education and experience to design the
tattoo. 42 After finalizing the design, Reed created the stencil that
would help transfer the agreed-upon drawing onto Wallace’s
skin. 43 Over their next three meetings, Reed applied the design
39. See R. Anthony Reese, The Public Display Right: The Copyright Act’s
Neglected Solution to the Controversy Over RAM “Copies,” 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
83, 84 (2001) (matching the changes in technology to the previously
unappreciated right of public display). Interestingly, the author recognizes that
the public display right “create[s] significant problems as more and more works
are used in digital form” and that the display right “has the potential to give
copyright owners excessive control over the use of their works.” Id.
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (outlining the various remedies and damages
available to a victim of copyright infringement). Importantly, to recover
statutory damages, an artist must have registered the copyright before filing
suit. See, e.g., Pye v. Mitchell, 574 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that only
a proprietor of a statutory copyright at the time of the acts of infringement can
collect damages). In other words, registering for a copyright after the acts of
infringement occur makes a potential victim ineligible to recover statutory
damages under the Act, and an artist would struggle to prove actual damages as
a result of the infringement. Id.
41. See Nike Complaint, supra note 14, at 3 (describing the initial
interaction between Reed and Wallace after recounting Reed’s career
development).
42. See id. (noting who contributed what to Wallace’s tattoo).
43. See id. (recounting what occurred during the second meeting between
Reed and Wallace).
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onto Wallace’s arm, for which Wallace paid Reed $450, 44 an
amount Reed considered inadequate except for the “exposure” he
believed he might receive as a result of Wallace’s fame as an NBA
player. 45
Reed obtained Copyright Registration Number VA 1-265-074
for the “Egyptian Family Pencil Drawing” that he then applied to
Wallace’s arm using the flash he designed. 46 Somewhat ironically,
Reed admitted in his Complaint that he wanted Wallace to
violate his exclusive rights as the registrant of the copyright on
the tattoo design by publicly displaying the tattoo at NBA games
and garnering Reed widespread recognition for his work. 47 Reed
“believed that he and his business would receive exposure as a
result of the tattoo being on an NBA player” and “observed the
tattoo during televised NBA games,” a public display that Reed
describes as “expected” and “common in the tattoo industry.” 48 By
indicating his acceptance of some violations of his exclusive rights
connected to his copyright, Reed demonstrated reluctance in his
argument that the artist must be sole owner of the exclusive
44. As a point of reference, Colin Kaepernick’s famed tattoo artist Nes
Andrion charges $120 for every hour that a tattoo takes to ink, with most of
Kaepernick’s tattoos taking well over four hours to complete. See Scott Soshnick,
Tattoo Artist Nabs $16 Million in Free Ads with Kaepernick’s Ink, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 30, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-30/tattooartist-nabs-16-million-in-free-ads-with-kaepernick-s-ink.html (last visited Nov.
6, 2015) (highlighting the benefits that Kaepernick’s tattoo artist received as a
result of Kaepernick’s high level of exposure) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). Wallace’s tattoo took three separate sessions, with an average
session lasting between four and six hours. See Julie H. Rose, Long Tattoo
Session, TATTOO HELP DESK (Sept. 23, 2008, 1:37 AM), http://tattoohelpdesk.
blogspot.com/2008/09/long-tattoo-sessions.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2015)
(describing that a “sleeve,” or full arm tattoo, could exceed thirteen hours of
work, and that most people cannot sit through more than four hours of tattooing
at a time) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Assuming
Wallace’s tattooing process took three sessions of four hours each at a price of
$120 per hour, Wallace paid over $1,000 for the final tattoo.
45. See Nike Complaint, supra note 14, at 3–4 (describing the final
tattooing process when Reed transferred the collaborative design onto Wallace’s
skin).
46. See id. at 4 (pointing out that Reed did obtain a copyright for the
drawing inked onto Wallace’s arm).
47. See id. (noting that Reed witnessed some public displays of the tattoo
by Wallace and actually expected those violations of his exclusive rights).
48. Id.
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rights. 49 But in the spring of 2004, things went too far—Reed
found out that Nike planned to highlight the tattoo on Wallace’s
arm as part of an advertising campaign. 50
The Nike commercial features two separate tattoos on
Wallace’s body: a bulldog not designed or inked by Reed and the
Egyptian version of Wallace’s family mentioned above. 51 In the
advertisement, Wallace describes both tattoos and their meaning,
as a simulated version of the creation process fills them in on his
arms. 52 Reed claimed that neither Nike nor Wallace contacted
him about the featured use of his original artwork in the
commercial, and he subsequently sued both Nike and Wallace. 53
Reed accused Nike of infringing on his copyright by reproducing,
distributing, adapting, and publicly displaying his original design
without his consent, permission, or authority. 54
Reed also sued Wallace on two separate counts: first, for
contributory infringement 55 of Reed’s copyright, and second, in
49. See id. (admitting that Reed expected and desired some violations of
the exclusive rights of reproduction, creating derivative works, publicly
displaying, and distributing copies of the copyrighted work).
50. See id. (“Mr. Reed became aware that the tattoo he had applied to Mr.
Wallace’s arm was being featured as part of an advertising campaign including
a commercial for Nike highlighting Mr. Wallace.”).
51. See robjv1, Rasheed Wallace NBA Finals Nike Commercial, YOUTUBE
(June 26, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RqmRu34PXrU (last visited
Nov. 5, 2015) (showing the Nike commercial featuring Wallace’s tattoos) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
52. See id. (featuring Wallace’s voice, which describes his tattoos as they
appear on his arms, using a computer simulation technique).
53. See Nike Complaint, supra note 14, at 4 (describing Nike’s wrongful
conduct as it related to Reed).
54. See id. at 4–5 (outlining Reed’s first claim for recovery against Nike).
55. Contributory infringement serves as a “separate avenue for third-party
liability in the copyright sphere,” distinct from direct copyright infringement
liability. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 12.04[A][3] (describing the
separate liability of related defendants in copyright infringement actions); G.
PETER ALBERT, JR. & AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CYBERSPACE 172 (2d ed. 2011) (imposing liability for
contributory infringement on defendants who are “not directly responsible for
the infringing act, but ha[ve] played a significant role in the direct infringement
committed by others”); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005) (attempting to accuse Grokster of contributory
infringement, although ultimately failing). Contributory infringement can
consist of “personal conduct that forms part of or furthers the infringement and
contribution of machinery or goods that provide the means to infringe.” NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 38, § 12.04[A][3]. The first type of contributory
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the alternative, for an accounting of his share in any revenue
Wallace garnered as a result of the use of the tattoo. 56 Reed’s first
claim for relief against Wallace accused Wallace of misleading
Nike as to the ownership of the intellectual property associated
with the tattoo and therefore contributing to Nike’s infringement
on Reed’s copyright. 57 Alternatively, Reed recognized that if
“Rasheed Wallace is the co-owner with [Reed] of the Copyright in
the artwork embodied in the tattoo on his upper arm, [Reed] is
entitled to share in any revenue realized by Mr. Wallace as the
result of any use, other than incidental use, of the tattoo.” 58 With
this claim, Reed admitted the possibility that Wallace might have
an ownership interest in the tattoo as well, clouding Reed’s claim
to the exclusive rights associated with his copyright.
Reed filed his original Complaint in February 2005, and the
clerk of the court entered an Order of Dismissal of the case in
October of that same year. 59 Some scholars considered Reed the
infringement, participation in infringement, occurs when a party, with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes
to the infringing conduct of another. See id. (denoting liability of a “contributory
infringer”). Knowledge that the work in question qualifies as an infringement
remains key to finding the first type of contributory infringement. See id. (“In
sum, then, given knowledge that the work in question constitutes an
infringement, then one who causes another to infringe will himself be liable as
an infringer . . . .”). To reiterate, the Supreme Court described a contributory
infringer as someone “in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by
others and had authorized the use without permission from the copyright
owner.” Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 (1984). The
second type of contributory infringement, providing means to infringe, occurs
when one, with knowledge, furnishes a copyrighted work to another, who then
wrongfully copies from that work. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38,
§ 12.04[A][3][b] (outlining the requirements for contributory infringement by
providing means to infringe to another).
56. See Nike Complaint, supra note 14, at 6–7 (claiming that Wallace
advised Nike that he possessed exclusive ownership of the intellectual property
rights in connection with the tattoo, contributing to Nike’s infringement of
Reed’s copyright by so doing, and alternatively asserting that Wallace share
profits from use of the tattoo with Reed).
57. See id. at 6 (“Defendant Wallace’s conduct induced, caused or
materially contributed to the unauthorized reproduction, adaptation, public
display and/or distribution of copies of the Plaintiff’s Copyrighted Work without
the consent or authority of Plaintiff in violation of Sections 106 and 501 of the
Copyright Act . . . .”).
58. Id. at 7.
59. See id. at 1 (dating the filing of Reed’s Complaint as February 10,
2005); Order of Dismissal at 1, Reed v. Nike, Inc., No. 3:05-CV-00198 (D. Or.
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first case to assert copyright infringement based on a tattoo and
believed that the case might open the floodgates for other
lawsuits similar in nature. 60 As evidenced by the lacking
precedent
and
ambiguous
law
addressing
tattoos’
copyrightability, Reed did no such thing. The case settled out of
court, and the settlement agreement remains confidential, just
like the following two cases involving tattoos and accusations of
copyright infringement. 61
B. Whitmill v. Warner Brothers Entertainment, Inc.
Perhaps the most (in)famous of the tattoo and copyright
cases, Whitmill v. Warner Brothers Entertainment, Inc. involved
the much anticipated release of The Hangover: Part II and Mike
Tyson’s face tattoo 62 artist, Victor Whitmill. 63 Whitmill designed
and applied the original tattoo to Tyson’s face in 2003, and Tyson
signed a release acknowledging that Whitmill would own the
artwork and copyright to the tattoo. 64 Eight years later, Warner
Brothers began advertising the release of The Hangover: Part II,
a sequel to the highly successful The Hangover, which depicted
three straight-laced friends who had some fun while getting into
trouble in Las Vegas. 65 Both the trailer for the sequel and the
Oct. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Nike Order of Dismissal] (“[T]his action is dismissed
with prejudice . . . .”).
60. See Christopher A. Harkins, Tattoos and Copyright Infringement:
Celebrities, Marketers, and Businesses Beware of the Ink, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 313, 315, 316 n.5 (2006) (analyzing and predicting what effects Reed v.
Wallace might have on future copyright infringement cases).
61. See Ira Boudway, Hey Pro Athletes: Your Tattoo Is Going to Get You
Sued, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/
articles/2013-09-04/hey-pro-athletes-your-tattooed-arms-are-going-to-get-yousued (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (observing that Reed’s case settled very quickly
after he filed it) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
62. See Warner Brothers Complaint, supra note 15, at Exhibit 4 (depicting
Mike Tyson with his face tattoo as a point of reference for the remainder of the
Complaint). See generally THE HANGOVER: PART II (Warner Brothers 2011).
63. Warner Brothers Complaint, supra note 15, at 1.
64. See id. at 2–3 (“Among his creations is one of the most distinctive
tattoos in the nation, an original design he created on the upper left side of
former world heavyweight champion boxer Mike Tyson’s face.”).
65. See id. at Exhibit 6 (depicting a poster advertisement of the upcoming
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movie poster featured a duplicate of Tyson’s tattoo on one of the
actor’s faces. 66
Like Reed a few years before him, Whitmill sued Warner
Brothers for infringing on his exclusive rights to the original
Mike Tyson tattoo under the Copyright Act. 67 In his Complaint,
he asserted that both the trailer and the poster constituted
unauthorized copying, distributing, and publicly displaying of the
copyrighted work, and that the version of the tattoo used in the
film qualified as an unauthorized derivative work. 68 Whitmill
cleverly sought both injunctive and monetary relief, putting
Warner Brothers at risk of foregoing the release of the film
altogether. 69
Similar to Reed, the parties settled outside of court quickly
after the filing of Whitmill’s Complaint, partially due to Warner
Brothers’ request for speediness to avoid delaying the release of
the film or having to digitally alter the tattoo throughout the
entire film. 70 In fact, the case settled less than two months after
film The Hangover: Part II, which clearly copies Mike Tyson’s tattoo); IGN, The
Hangover Part 2: Official Movie Trailer, YOUTUBE (Apr. 1, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=snlWDffZfyk (last visited Nov. 6, 2015)
(showing the sequel’s trailer, which includes the actor with a replica of Tyson’s
face tattoo for over half of the advertisement’s duration) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also A.O. Scott, Dudes Doing Vegas:
Eating and Other Stuff, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com
/2009/06/05/movies/05hang.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (describing the
plotline and characters of the first The Hangover movie) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
66. See Warner Brothers Complaint, supra note 15, at Exhibit 6 (showing a
copied version of Tyson’s tattoo on the movie poster for the film); id. at 5
(describing the heavy use of the pirated replica in the promotional materials for
the film).
67. See id. at 7 (claiming that Warner Brothers infringed on all of his
exclusive rights to the original tattoo).
68. See id. (listing his claims for recovery against Warner Brothers for
infringing on his exclusive rights under the Copyright Act).
69. See id. at 7–8 (requesting a preliminary injunction on the release of the
film but also awards to compensate Whitmill for his monetary damages).
70. See Matthew Belloni, Warner Bros. Settles ‘Hangover II’ Tattoo Lawsuit
(Exclusive), HOLLYWOOD REP. (June 20, 2011, 1:39 PM), http://www.hollywood
reporter.com/thr-esq/warner-bros-settles-hangover-ii-203377 (last visited Nov. 6,
2015) (noting that “Warner’s attorneys must have been concerned that [Judge]
Perry suggested she saw merit in the case . . . [and] planned to digitally alter
the tattoo for the home video version of the film if the case didn’t settle quickly”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Whitmill filed. 71 Unlike the court in Reed, however, the judge
assigned to Whitmill made statements about the law surrounding
copyright and tattoos during a preliminary hearing. 72 The day
before the case settled outside of court, Judge Perry heard
arguments on Whitmill’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction to
prevent Warner Brothers from releasing the film if it contained
any semblance of his copyrighted work. 73 Relying on the
Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C. L. Systems, Inc. 74 factors to
determine whether to grant a preliminary injunction, Judge
Perry denied Whitmill’s motion. 75
Before denying Whitmill the preliminary injunction, Judge
Perry addressed the merits of the case, concluding, “I think
Plaintiff has a strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits for
copyright infringement.” 76 She continued to comment on the
merits and criticized Warner Brothers’ various defenses to the
copyright infringement claim, including Warner Brothers’
argument that tattoos were not copyrightable subject matter. 77 In
her strongest statement in favor of Whitmill, Judge Perry stated,
71. See Warner Brothers Complaint, supra note 15, at 1 (identifying the
filing date as April 28, 2011); Order of Dismissal at 1, Whitmill v. Warner Bros.
Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-00752 (E.D. Mo. June 22, 2011) (listing the date of
dismissal with prejudice as June 22, 2011, just two months after the date of
filing).
72. Compare Nike Order of Dismissal, supra note 59, at 1 (settling well in
advance of trial and never arguing the legal issues before the judge), with
Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, Whitmill v.
Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-00752 (E.D. Mo. June 21, 2011)
[hereinafter Warner Brothers Hearing] (transcribing a Hearing on Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, during which Judge Perry ruled on several issues
pertaining to copyright law and tattoos).
73. See Warner Brothers Hearing, supra note 72, at 2 (concluding that the
“balance of equities favor[ed]” Warner Brothers when comparing the harms of a
preliminary injunction to both parties).
74. 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981).
75. See Warner Brothers Hearing, supra note 72, at 9 (considering whether
to grant Whitmill’s preliminary injunction based on the Dataphase factors:
(1) plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits, (2) whether plaintiff is
threatened with irreparable harm, (3) the balance of equities, and (4) the public
interest). “So when I put all the four factors together, I’m going to deny the
preliminary injunction.” Id.
76. Id. at 3.
77. See id. (pontificating that Whitmill would win on the merits, perhaps to
encourage the parties to settle, which they did later that day).
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“Most of the defendant’s arguments against [copyright
infringement] are just silly. Of course tattoos can be copyrighted.
I don’t think there is any reasonable dispute about that.” 78 The
parties settled later that day. 79
C. Allen v. Electronic Arts, Inc.
This case involved professional football player Ricky
Williams, his tattoo artist Scott Allen, and video game empire
Electronic Arts, Inc., also referred to as EA Sports. 80 Ricky
Williams visited Crybabies Tattoo, Allen’s place of business, and
requested Allen apply a tattoo to his upper arm. 81 In his
Complaint, Allen, like Reed before him, admitted that he knew
Williams as a professional football player and “assumed he would
see his art on television.” 82 In early 2010, however, Allen saw his
tattoo art displayed not just during NFL games but also on the
cover of EA Sports’ games, including NFL Street, Madden NFL
10, and Madden NFL 11. 83 Like Reed, Allen could accept—and
actually expected—some violations of his exclusive rights, but a
featured use of a derivative work went too far. 84 Allen sued EA
Sports for violating his exclusive rights and specifically for
copying, reproducing, distributing, making an unauthorized
78. Id.
79. See ADR Compliance Report at 1, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t,
Inc., No. 4:11-CV-00752 (E.D. Mo. June 21, 2011) (indicating that the parties
achieved a settlement agreement).
80. See Electronic Arts Complaint, supra note 16, at 2 (listing the parties
as Scott Allen, a tattoo artist at Crybabies Tattoo, Electronic Arts, Inc., a
manufacturer and seller of video games, and Ricky Williams, an NFL player and
recipient of a tattoo from Allen).
81. See id. (describing the first interaction between Williams and Allen).
82. See id. at 3 (admitting that Allen expected to see a public display of his
work on Williams on television).
83. See id. at 3–4 (noting that the plaintiff “became aware” that EA Sports
displayed and used Williams’s tattoo on multiple video game covers); id. at
Exhibits 2–3 (depicting the cover of NFL Street, Madden NFL 10, and Madden
NFL 11, which all included animated replicas of Allen’s tattoo art on Williams’s
body).
84. See id. at 4 (accusing Electronic Arts of copying, reproducing,
distributing, adapting, and publicly displaying the copyrighted work without
obtaining consent, permission, or authority from Allen first).
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derivative work, and publicly displaying the copyrighted work. 85
Allen also sued Williams for contributory infringement of his
copyright and exclusive rights; in the alternative, he sued
Williams for an accounting of his share in the profit from any use
of the tattoo as a co-owner of the work. 86
Allen’s Complaint against EA Sports and Williams appears
eerily similar to Reed’s Complaint against Nike and Wallace—
both artists sued a company for use of the copyrighted work in an
advertisement, while also suing the recipient of the tattoo for
either contributing to the advertisement’s infringement or for
failing to share profits from their use of the copyrighted work. 87
Like Reed’s suit against Nike and Wallace, Allen ultimately
entered into a settlement agreement with EA Sports and
Williams, just three and a half months after filing his
complaint. 88
D. What the Cases Mean
Most tattoo artists agree that “turning to the courts for
copyright protection would simply not be worth it” because a
lawsuit would take too long, cost too much, and distract the artist
from his or her work. 89 Additionally, a lawsuit poses a lot of
85. See id. at 5 (citing Copyright Act §§ 106 and 501 as Allen’s causes of
action against Electronic Arts).
86. See id. at 6, 9 (describing Allen’s claims against Williams).
87. Compare Nike Complaint, supra note 14 (suing Nike for featuring the
tattoo in a commercial and suing Wallace for contributing to Nike’s
infringement or for failing to share profits from the use of the tattoo), with
Electronic Arts Complaint, supra note 16 (suing EA Sports for featuring the
tattoo on the cover of three video games and suing Williams for contributing to
EA Sports’ infringement or for failing to share profits from the use of the tattoo).
88. See Order at 1, Allen v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-03172 (W.D. La.
Apr. 9, 2013) (dismissing the case after plaintiff’s motion to do so).
89. See Matthew Beasley, Note, Who Owns Your Skin: Intellectual Property
Law and Norms Among Tattoo Artists, 85 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 1158 (2012)
(interviewing tattoo artists to discuss the effectiveness of intellectual property
law and its relation to protecting their rights). Most tattoo artists expressed
mixed feelings and ignorance regarding lawsuits for unauthorized copying of
their artwork, indicating that direct confrontation of other infringing artists
occurred more often than resorting to the legal system. See id. (relating tattoo
artists’ reluctance to file lawsuits against one another and their preference to
handle matters on their own).
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ambiguity and uncertainty for a plaintiff tattoo artist because to
date, “no cases concerning the copyrightability of tattoos have
gone to trial.” 90 The fact that all three major cases settled
indicates at least some fear on the part of the defendants that
tattoo artists have legitimate copyright infringement claims, and
Judge Perry’s oral pontificating in the Whitmill case seems to
support that same conclusion. 91 Alternatively, all the defendants
wanted to avoid the nuisance of ongoing litigation and the bad
publicity associated with a trial, recognized litigation as a cost of
doing business, and could afford to throw settlement money at
their copyright problems without any negative effect on their
businesses; their settlements do not necessarily demonstrate the
validity of the artists’ claims. 92 Without a trial and a subsequent
holding, however, the case law surrounding this topic remains
unpersuasive.
IV. The Scholarship’s Alternatives: Failed Proposals to Protect the
Interests of Artists, Industries, and Clients
A. Fair Use
In asserting their affirmative defenses to the tattoo artists’
claims of copyright infringement, both Nike and Warner Brothers
claimed that their uses of the tattoos constituted fair uses of the
copyrighted works. 93 Section 107 of the Copyright Act first
90. See King, supra note 11, at 129–30 (2013) (addressing the “ambiguity
regarding the legal protectability of tattoos and the negative impact such
ambiguity has on the rights of tattoo artists and their clients/customers”).
91. See Warner Brothers Hearing, supra note 72, at 3 (indicating that
Judge Perry believed Whitmill would win on the merits in his copyright
infringement suit against Warner Brothers).
92. See Timothy C. Bradley, The Copyright Implications of Tattoos: Why
Getting Inked Can Get You into Court, 29 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 31 (2011)
(“[D]isputes will continue to settle before trial, considering that the disputed
uses . . . have much at stake, and the incentive to settle quickly is high.”); see,
e.g., Belloni, supra note 70 (highlighting Warner Brothers’ interest in settling
the lawsuit because litigation continued “just days before the film was scheduled
to be released,” threatening to damage Warner Brothers’ financial interests in
the film).
93. See Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
at 6, Reed v. Nike, Inc., No. 3:05-CV-00198 (D. Or. Apr. 14, 2005) [hereinafter
Nike Answer] (“Defendants’ alleged conduct constitutes fair use.”); Bradley,
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identifies six uses within the scope of the fair use doctrine:
“criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship or research.” 94 The Act goes
on to outline the factors to consider in a fair use analysis, which
include: (1) the purpose and character of the use, such as
commercial versus nonprofit use of the work; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market or value of the
copyrighted work. 95 Other authorities have described the defense
of fair use as “a privilege in others than the owner of a copyright
to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without
his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner
by the copyright.” 96 The authorities agree that Congress, when
supra note 92, at 30 (discussing Warner Brothers’ assertion of the affirmative
defense of fair use).
94. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (listing categories of
works that generally meet the fair use test, a defense to copyright
infringement).
95. See id. (identifying factors to aid in determining whether the use of a
work qualifies as fair). This Note primarily focuses on the first factor, the
purpose and character of the use, because of the lack of dispute surrounding the
other three factors for the fair use of copyrighted tattoos. Most copyrighted
tattoos inherently possess some creativity, which limits the fair use defense. See
ALBERT & AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 55, at 197 (“Thus a
broader fair use approach applies to works that are information or that stress
utility over creativity.”). Madden NFL’s copying of the work appropriates the
entirety of the tattoo, not a minimal portion of the work. See id. at 198
(“Appropriation of an entire work is often sufficient to preclude a fair use
defense.”). Finally, widespread copying and display of the copyrighted work
would undoubtedly have a substantial impact on the artists’ market. See id. at
199 (noting the importance of the fourth fair use factor and emphasizing that a
substantial market impact forecloses fair use as a defense); Am. Geophysical
Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 926–31 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that the fourth
factor favored the publishers who sued for copyright infringement, despite
evidence of limited effect on the potential market for the copyrighted works).
But see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (refusing to
focus on the fourth factor as the most prudent and imploring courts to avoid
treating the fourth factor in isolation, ultimately demanding a weighing test of
all four).
96. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 36, § 10:1 (2d ed. 2004) (enhancing the
definition of fair use to include “an equitable rule of reason” and a use “allowed
as reasonable and customary on the theory that the author must have foreseen
it and tacitly consented to it”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976)
(illustrating the intended breadth of § 107 with a variety of examples, including
quotations of excerpts in a review, quotations in scholarly works, parody,
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creating the equitable fair use defense, aimed to confirm the Act’s
basic goal of putting copyrighted works to their most beneficial
uses for the good of the public. 97
Congress and the courts rely on two overlapping approaches
to the fair use defense: a private benefit approach and a public
benefit approach. 98 The primary distinction between the two
approaches exists in the first factor of the Act: commercial use
versus copying for nonprofit use. 99 Initially, courts found that any
commercial use created a presumption of unfairness because “the
user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material
without paying the customary price.” 100 A commercial use
infringer can rebut the presumption of unfairness by
demonstrating certain characteristics of a particular commercial
use, as the defendant did in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc. 101 In Sega, the defendant copied the plaintiff’s copyrighted
software for purposes of reverse engineering it to create its own
competing software. 102 Although the defendant’s ultimate
purpose was commercial, its direct purpose was not, and the
court found that the defendant had a legitimate interest in
studying certain aspects of the plaintiff’s software, and that the
reproductions in libraries to replace part of a damaged copy, and copying a work
in legislative or judicial proceedings).
97. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 36, § 10:1 (2d ed. 2004) (noting that the
fair use defense does not contradict copyright law’s basic goal of harmonizing
the claims of individual creators with the benefits to the public).
98. See id. (identifying the two primary theories that separate fair use
analyses, which emphasize the importance of the first factor for fair use set
forth in the Act).
99. See id. (“Congress and the courts have reconciled the public good with
the claims of individuals through two, overlapping, approaches to the fair use
defense.”); ALBERT & AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 55, at 190
(conflating Goldstein’s bifurcated approach to the fair use defense with the
distinction that relies on the question of commercial use).
100. See ALBERT & AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 55, at 190
(identifying the inherent unfairness of profiting from another’s copyrighted
work); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1558 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
(holding that any commercial use creates a “meaningful likelihood that future
market harm exists,” regardless of the presence or absence of the other factors).
101. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir.
1992) (“However, the presumption of unfairness that arises in such cases can be
rebutted by the characteristics of a particular commercial use.”).
102. See id. at 1523 (describing the defendant’s actions that infringed on
plaintiff’s copyrighted work).
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defendant’s purpose served the public by disseminating
unprotected ideas. 103
The Ninth Circuit expanded the bounds of the fair use
defense in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 104 when it found a search
engine’s copying of thumbnail versions of copyrighted images for
purposes of indexing a fair use. 105 Ultimately, the court
characterized the defendant search engine’s use as a
“transformative use” because the purpose “of the thumbnail
images was to provide an index, which greatly differed from the
aesthetic purpose of the images.” 106 Fair use requires that the
subsequent presentation and use transform the original
copyrighted work and serve some alternative purpose from the
original, as Kelly and later cases such as Perfect 10 v.
Amazon.com, Inc. 107 emphasized. 108
Despite courts’ continual development of the fair use defense,
video games, broadcasts, and players cannot successfully assert it
to defend their copying and displays of copyrighted tattoos. 109
This defense primarily fails due to the emphasis courts place on
the commercial versus nonprofit use factor. 110 Clearly, players,
103. See id. (holding that the defendant copied “for a legitimate, essentially
non-exploitative purpose, and that the commercial aspect of its use can best be
described as of minimal significance”).
104. 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
105. See id. at 821 (finding that Arriba’s reproduction of Kelly’s images for
use as thumbnails in Arriba’s search engine constituted a fair use).
106. See id. at 822 (describing the differences between the defendant’s
transformative use and the artist’s original purpose for the copyrighted images
then turned into thumbnails).
107. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). In this case, the court upheld the validity
of Google Images’ cataloging and framing of Perfect 10’s copyrighted images
because Google’s use and purpose both qualified as transformative. See id. at
1168 (“Google has put Perfect 10’s thumbnail images (along with millions of
other thumbnail images) to a use fundamentally different than the use intended
by Perfect 10. In doing so, Google has provided a significant benefit to the
public.”).
108. See ALBERT & AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 55, at 193
(“As can be seen, fair use requires that the presentation and use be
transformative and not simply a verbatim copy that serves the same purpose as
the original.”).
109. See, e.g., Warner Brothers Hearing, supra note 72, at 4 (commenting
on the “likelihood of success on the merits analysis of the fair use” defense and
doubting its success in such a distinctly commercial case).
110. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text (describing the

WHO HAS THE MOST SKIN IN THE GAME?

1969

video games, and other related industries profit significantly from
the copyright infringements associated with their businesses, and
none of the parties at fault can point to a transformative purpose
for their uses of the copyrighted work. 111 Although the
scholarship presents fair use as a legitimate solution to the
problem of copyright and tattoos, it fails in the situation
presented by Madden NFL and professional athletes’ careers,
which both profit substantially from their infringing activities.
B. Work Made for Hire
The work for hire doctrine presents an alternative possibility
to resolve artist and client disputes for commissioned tattoos. 112 A
work for hire “is a work prepared by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment, or a work specially ordered or
commissioned to fit within a list of nine categories that treat the
tattooer as an independent contractor.” 113 As tattoos do not
importance of the first factor for fair use analysis in the Copyright Act as
between commercial and not-for-profit uses of a copyrighted work).
111. See Warner Brothers Hearing, supra note 72, at 3 (doubting the
effectiveness of Warner Brothers’ fair use defense for lack of transforming or
parodying the Tyson tattoo in some way, and for the plain fact that Warner
Brothers stood to profit heavily from the film). Additionally, the fair use doctrine
primarily defends against a single use of a copyrighted work, not multiple
infringing uses. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 465 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (referencing a Senate report
accompanying the Copyright Act of 1976 as preferring single copies and not
multiple copies when attempting to assert fair use as a defense).
112. See Meredith Hatic, Who Owns Your Body Art?: The Copyright and
Constitutional Implications of Tattoos, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 396, 429 (2012) (admitting that using the work-for-hire exception in the
Copyright Act to protect tattoo artists and clients is “a bit of a stretch”).
113. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 5.03 (“The employer or other
person for whom the for-hire work was prepared is considered the author for
copyright purposes.”); Nickow, supra note 13, at 204 (defining a work for hire in
the tattoo context); see also Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012)
(describing that in the case of a “work made for hire, the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of
this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written
instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright”).
The nine categories for commissioned works that treat the artist as an
independent contractor include works
specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work, as a part of a motion picture . . . as a translation, as a

1970

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1947 (2015)

satisfy the terms of § 101 of the Act for a work made for hire by
an independent contractor, this Note only examines the work
made for hire doctrine as it relates to employees working within
the scope of employment. 114 The statute takes a restrictive
approach to the work made for hire doctrine, so if the artist–
client relationship does not fall within the Act’s narrow definition
of a work made for hire, the client owns the tattoo only if the
artist expressly assigns his or her ownership rights to the
client. 115 Therefore, “[e]ven if the client is contracting with a
vendor for materials that will be developed expressly for the
client and at the client’s expense, the client will not own the
materials.” 116 The tattoo artist would be the employee of the
tattoo recipient, and the tattoo on the recipient would be the work
made for hire.
In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 117 the Court
interpreted Congress’s use of “employee” and “employment” in
the Copyright Act to include only the terms’ settled and common
law definitions, limiting the scope of the terms to the
conventional relation of employer and employee. 118 Reid
mandated reliance on common law agency doctrine in the absence
of a formal employment agreement, which considers the hiring
party’s right to control the manner and means by which the
employee creates the product. 119
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instruction text, as a
test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties
expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work
shall be considered a work made for hire.
Id. § 101.
114. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (limiting the work made for hire defense for
independent contractors to nine specific categories, none of which include
pictorial or graphic works).
115. See Cathy Kiselyak Austin, U.S. Copyright Act—“Work Made For Hire”
Doctrine, in UNDERSTANDING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSE 609, 611
(2004) (“If the deliverables do not fall with[in] the statute’s narrow definition of
‘works made for hire,’ the client can own them only if the vendor explicitly
assigns its ownership rights to the client.”).
116. Id.
117. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
118. See id. at 731 (considering the meaning of “employee” and
“employment” as used in the Copyright Act to determine if a work qualified as a
work made for hire).
119. See id. at 752 (“To determine whether a work is a ‘work made for hire’
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The Court then listed other relevant factors to decide if a
work qualifies as a work made for hire: the skill required by the
employee; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the
location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the
employee and the hiring party; the method of payment; the
business of the hiring party; the provision of employee benefits;
and the tax treatment of the employee. 120 Like Reid, the sculptor
in the case, tattoo artists clearly are not employees of their clients
but are independent contractors. 121
The Court determined that sculpting was a skilled
occupation, that Reid supplied his own tools, that he worked in
his own studio and only for Community for Creative Non-Violence
(CCNV) for a short period of time, that his payment depended on
his completion of a specific job, and that CCNV did not owe
payroll or Social Security taxes or provide any employee benefits
to Reid. 122 With a plethora of factors to support its holding, the
Court definitively labeled Reid an independent contractor, and
because sculptures (like tattoos) fall outside the nine categories in
§ 101, the work in question was not a work made for hire. 123 The
similarities between tattoos created for clients and the sculptural
work that Reid produced for CCNV are striking and thereby
eliminate the work made for hire doctrine as a legitimate defense

within the § 101 definition, a court should first apply general common law of
agency principles to ascertain whether the work was prepared by an employee
or an independent contractor . . . .”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 1 (1958) (defining an agency relationship and emphasizing that an agency
relationship does not require intent to create an agency relationship); 1 NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 38, § 5.03[B][1][a][iii] (observing the similarity between
the Court’s adopted agency test (the right to control the product) and the tests
the Court rejected (the hiring party retains the right or actually wields the right
to control the product)).
120. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752 (1989)
(exhausting a list of other factors in the work made for hire analysis).
121. See id. (labeling Reid as an independent contractor, not an employee of
Community for Creative Non-Violence).
122. See id. at 753 (applying the list of factors from § 220(2) of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY to Reid and determining his status as an
independent contractor and not an employee).
123. See id. (noting that the CCNV conceded that the sculptural work could
not satisfy the terms of § 101, eliminating the possibility that the sculpture was
a work made for hire).
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for professional athletes, video games, and other displayers of a
copyrighted tattoo. 124
C. Joint Authorship
For some clients, such as Wallace, the authorities suggest
joint authorship as a defense. 125 The Copyright Act specifically
addresses works that result from the effort of multiple authors,
stating that “[t]he authors of a joint work are co-owners of
copyright in the work.” 126 Section 101 of the Act defines a joint
work as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the
intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 127 In his famed treatise,
renowned copyright scholar Melville Nimmer describes some
examples that illustrate the concept of joint works: products of
joint authorship, works for which the author transfers copyright
to more than one person, a copyrighted work that passes via
intestacy or will of the author, a work that gives the renewal
rights to a class consisting of more than one person, or a work
subject to community property laws in certain states. 128
Nimmer recognizes the limitations of categorizing joint works
and products of joint authorship and instead explains the concept
as a product of two distinctive theories: inseparability, which
occurs when each author cannot separately identify his or her
124. See Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511, 534
(2013) (“Custom tattoos are almost certainly not works made for hire as defined
by the Copyright Act.”). Cf. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38,
§ 5.03[B][1][a][iv] (suggesting a return to the formalist position that only formal,
salaried employees qualify under the work for hire doctrine, despite the Court’s
analysis in Reid).
125. See Nike Answer, supra note 93, at 6 (asserting joint authorship as a
defense to Reed’s infringement allegations because of Wallace’s participation in
the creative process).
126. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012) (defining a joint
work).
127. See id. § 101 (emphasizing the requirement of intent to qualify as a
joint work).
128. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 6.01 (describing the
circumstances that result in a joint work with multiple owners of a copyright).
“A joint work may more properly be defined as one in which the copyright is
owned in undivided shares by two or more persons.” Id.
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contributions, and interdependency, where the authors’
contributions become an indivisible whole pursuant to an implied
agreement between them. 129 Intent remains a touchstone for joint
works of joint authors—the parties must intend to create a
unitary, whole product. 130 If joint authors possess the requisite
intent to create a joint work, the authors can contribute
unequally to the ultimate product but still possess equal rights in
the product’s copyright. 131 To fall within the Act’s definition of an
author, however, a joint author must supply intellectuality to the
project—the law requires more than physical labor. 132
Rasheed Wallace asserted joint authorship as an affirmative
defense. 133 Recall that Wallace proposed the initial concept for his
tattoo, including the Egyptian theme and characters, but Reed
created the sketch and flash design for the tattoo before its
application on Wallace’s arm. 134 This give and take of ideas and
129. See id. § 6.02 (noting the two justifications for the principle of joint
authorship as works with inseparable contributions by each author and works
where the respective contributions depend on each other to produce an
indivisibly whole product); see also Brown v. McCormick, 23 F. Supp. 2d 594,
605 (D. Md. 1998) (illustrating interdependency when presuming that the
lyricist and composer of a song, despite contributing separately identifiable
elements of the final product, intended that each have an undivided interest in
the combined product of their respective efforts).
130. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 6.03 (describing how the
authors must have “the intention that their contributions be merged . . . at the
moment in time when the work is created, not some later date”). But see Edward
B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 268, 270 (2d Cir. 1944)
(holding that joint authorship requires each author to intend that his
contribution constitute a part of a total work at the time he creates it, not that
both authors have the same intention at the same time).
131. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 6.07[A][1] (noting that equal
contributions are not required, but more than a de minimis contribution is
required to create a joint work).
132. See id. § 6.07[A][2] (“Further, the contribution must be one of
authorship in order to constitute the contributor a joint author.”); Kyjen Co. v.
Vo-Toys, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1068 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (defining what acts
an author must perform to qualify as an author for purposes of determining
joint work status).
133. See Nike Answer, supra note 93, at 6 (“Defendant Wallace is the sole
owner, or alternatively a joint author, of the work.”).
134. Compare Nike Complaint, supra note 14, at 3 (describing the
interactions and exchanging of ideas between Wallace and Reed before Reed
inking the final tattoo on Wallace’s arm), with Nike Answer, supra note 93, at 3
(admitting that Wallace met with Reed to discuss the design of his tattoo but
indicating that Reed aided in the design process and solely applied the final
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design suggestions remains commonplace in the custom tattoo
world, creating the appearance of joint authorship between the
client and the tattooist. 135 The heavy emphasis on intent to create
a joint work between authors, however, undermines this
defense. 136 Tattoo artists’ clients do not typically intend to create
a joint work and more frequently rely on the artists’ expertise to
create a final, copyrightable product. 137 Generally, a client’s
minimal contribution at the beginning of the creative process,
including his or her suggestion of ideas or provision of
photographs or inspiration, falls under the de minimis exception
for joint works, precluding the client from claiming any
authorship in the final product. 138
D. Implied Nonexclusive License
An implied license protects a client from an artist’s claim of
copyright infringement for simply appearing in public. 139
tattoo).
135. See Guen Douglas, The Process of Getting a Custom Tattoo, TATTOO
ARTIST MAG. (Sept. 22, 2011), http://tattooartistmagazineblog.com/2011/09/22/
guen-douglas-tattoos-process-of-getting-a-custom-tattoo-artist-magazine-blog/
(last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (noting that most tattoo artists draw and sketch
designs after the initial consultation but do not charge the client for this service)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
136. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 6.03 (recognizing intent as
the touchstone of the joint work doctrine).
137. See Douglas, supra note 135 (describing how clients generally “like to
give their artist freedom to explore a subject”); Perzanowski, supra note 124, at
533 (“Because of their greater familiarity with theories of design and
composition, as well as a clearer understanding of the limitations of the
medium, tattooers frequently guide their clients toward choices that, while true
to the client’s original conception, are more likely to translate well into
tattoos.”).
138. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 6.07[A][1] (discussing de
minimis contributions as preventing a contributor from claiming joint
authorship of a work); Perzanowski, supra note 124, at 535 (pointing out that
“the contributions of most clients are unlikely to meet the threshold of
authorship” for the joint authorship defense to succeed in the tattoo context).
139. See Hatic, supra note 112, at 432 (“If a subject has a nonexclusive
license to display his tattoo, he has an affirmative defense to a claim of
copyright infringement by the artist/owner.”). For example, if a tattoo artist
obtains an implied license for another artist’s flash, the artist with the license
can copy the design for purposes of transferring it to a client’s skin. See
Perzanowski, supra note 124, at 560 (discussing the widely accepted practice of
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Exclusive licenses and other transfers of copyright ownership
must occur in writing, and the owner of the rights conveyed must
sign the document. 140 An artist can grant or imply a nonexclusive
license by spoken word or even mere conduct. 141 An implied
nonexclusive license does not transfer any ownership interest in
the copyrighted work to the licensee but allows the licensee to use
the work in ways specified by the licensor. 142
Scholars praise courts that choose to recognize implied
nonexclusive licenses but tend to limit their theory to
noncommercial displays of the copyrighted work. 143 As previously
discussed, 144 the highly commercial nature of professional
athletes’ careers and most related activities excludes the
possibility of an implied nonexclusive license serving as a valid
defense in copyright infringement cases against them. 145
implied licenses and flash designs). The artist that acquires the license may not,
however, copy it for other purposes, such as printing t-shirts or creating
competing sheets of flash to sell. See id. (noting that these actions would exceed
the scope of the implied license and also violate industry norms regarding flash).
140. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012) (requiring certain
formalities for the instrument of a conveyance in ownership of a copyrighted
work); see also 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 10.03[A][1][a] (listing the
cumulative aspects required to successfully convey ownership or rights in a
copyright to another in writing).
141. See Hatic, supra note 112, at 431 (“However, nonexclusive licenses may
be granted orally or may be implied from conduct.”).
142. See id. at 432 (“If a subject has a nonexclusive license to display his
tattoo, he has an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright infringement by the
artist/owner.”).
143. See id. at 431 (identifying courts that created elements for finding a
nonexclusive implied license). The elements relied on by some courts include:
(1) the purported licensee requests the creation of the work, (2) the copyright
owner creates the work and delivers it to the licensee, and (3) the copyright
owner intends the licensee to use the work as the licensee does. See Hevia v.
Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2010) (identifying factors that strongly
suggest the finding of an implied nonexclusive license, although declining to
recognize such a license in the case at hand).
144. See supra notes 110–111 and accompanying text (highlighting that the
extremely commercial nature of all uses of a copyrighted tattoo prevent clients
and industries from relying on the fair use defense).
145. See Verified Answer to Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Other
Relief at 8, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-00752 (E.D. Mo.
May 20, 2011) (claiming that “Warner Bros. ha[d] an implied license from
plaintiff to use Mr. Tyson’s tattoo in The Hangover: Part II”). Judge Perry
doubted the validity of claiming a nonexclusive implied license as a defense, too.
See Warner Brothers Hearing, supra note 72, at 4 (“[T]here is no evidence at all
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Additionally, because an artist can revoke the implied license at
any point and due to the limited scope of such license, this
solution remains less than ideal for clients and the video game
industry. 146
E. The National Football League Players Association’s Advice to
Players
In response to the uncertainty surrounding the
aforementioned defenses, the NFLPA stepped into the role of
proactive legal advisor for its members. 147 During the NFL
Combine, a training camp for potential professional football
players, the Association correctly proposed the most ideal
solution. 148 It “advised agents to tell their players that when they
get tattoos going forward, they should get a release from the
tattoo artist, and if they can track down their former artists, they
should get a release” from them as well. 149 Failing to obtain
that Warner Brothers had any kind of license implied or otherwise to use the
tattoo, and so Warner Brothers’ use of the tattoo was unauthorized . . . .”).
146. See Craig P. Bloom, Note, Hangover Effect: May I See Your Tattoo,
Please, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 435, 470 (2013) (“An implied license is
generally revocable by the copyright owner.”); Perzanowski, supra note 124, at
560 (highlighting the failures of the implied license as a protection due to its
limited scope).
147. See Heitner & Wilmot, supra note 6, at 322 (“NFLPA officials started
advising players to get copyright waivers or licenses from their tattoo artists as
a result of Stephen Allen’s lawsuit against EA Sports and former NFL running
back Ricky Williams for use of a tattoo on NFL Street video game covers.”);
Darren Heitner, Questions Concerning Copyright of Athlete Tattoos Has
(Aug.
14,
2013,
8:01
AM),
Companies
Scrambling,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2013/08/14/questions-concerningcopyright-of-athlete-tattoos-has-companies-scrambling/ (last visited Nov. 6,
2015) (noting the appreciation of players towards the NFLPA for warning them
about their potential liability but insisting that the NFLPA “should have been
on top of it earlier”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
148. See Heitner, supra note 147 (discussing the various suggestions the
NFLPA makes to new players at the NFL Combine to prevent tattoo issues from
surfacing in the future for players, teams, sponsors, and other industry
participants).
149. Id.; see also Bradley, supra note 92, at 31 (“Encourage both tattoo
artists and tattoo recipients to sign copyright agreements outlining the relative
transfer or retention of tattoo intellectual property rights.”); Heitner & Wilmot,
supra note 6, at 320 (urging athletes to seek a transfer of right in the copyright
prior to the ink drying but recognizing that this transfer might cause artists to
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releases from tattoo artists may result in the NFLPA requiring a
player to indemnify the NFLPA and its associated companies
from any and all claims made by the player’s tattoo artists. 150 The
NFLPA, however, recognizes that forcing players to obtain signed
releases every time they want a new tattoo remains wildly
unrealistic and therefore requires an alternative. 151
V. A Better Solution: The Featured Use Test
A. Reiterating the Problem: Valid yet Competing Interests
Clearly, the competing and contradicting rights of the player,
the artist, and the video game pose serious dilemmas for the
development of copyright law in this arena. 152 Players possess
their own rights of publicity, which include the ability to choose
where they make appearances and which media outlets they
allow to use their likenesses. 153 Tattoo artists, like other authors
of creative, pictorial, and graphic works, lawfully deserve some
charge additional fees).
150. See Heitner, supra note 147 (describing the NFLPA’s lucrative group
licensing program that requires heavy legal protection from copyright lawsuits,
including lawsuits from players’ tattoo artists).
151. See id. (hinting that the NFLPA’s attempt to reduce its exposure
depends on the players carrying the NFLPA’s plan through); Bradley, supra
note 92, at 31 (suggesting that lawyers who represent celebrities and
professional athletes should encourage their clients to consult with them before
getting tattooed, despite the unrealistic nature of this practice pointer).
152. See King, supra note 11, at 130 (identifying a “handful of other
copyright lawsuits [that] have shed some light on how the courts might analyze
the unique issues that arise in the determination of copyrightability of tattoos
and the problems that flow from providing copyright protection to these creative
works”); Perzanowski, supra note 124, at 530 (recognizing the “parade of
horribles” associated with tattoo artists actually obtaining exclusive rights
under the Copyright Act as alarming but suggesting that tattoo industry norms
and practices resolve the problem); Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 7 (asking
if artists should have the right to order their clients to stay off a movie set and
deciding that, although copyright law gives that power to an artist, “no court
would or should allow it”).
153. See Garrett Rice, Note, Groove is in the Hart: A Workable Solution for
Applying the Right of Publicity to Video Games, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 317,
323–35 (2015) (differentiating between the right of publicity and the right to
privacy and emphasizing that the right to publicity “guards an individual’s right
to profit from his own identity,” prohibiting others from exploiting his or her
identity without consent).
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degree of protection for their designs from the Copyright Act. 154
The video game industry maintains an interest in continuing to
enhance the realism in its games, which apparently increases the
profitability and popularity of games. 155 While all these rights
appear valid, they cannot coexist without imposing on one
another. 156 As discussed in Part IV, other authorities attempt to
cobble together solutions that only pose further problems for one
party or another, thus paving the way for the acceptance of a
novel proposal before the ink dries on this pressing issue. 157
B. When All Else Fails
1. The Policy Position: Prioritizing Personal Dignity over
Protection for Artists
As a testament to this country’s longstanding commitment to
personal autonomy, tattoo artists still should not receive any
copyright protection for nonfeatured uses of their inked art, even
when players inevitably fail to obtain the necessary
documentation suggested by the NFLPA. 158 Although most
154. See Warner Brothers Hearing, supra note 72, at 3 (“Of course tattoos
can be copyrighted. I don’t think there is any reasonable dispute about that.”).
But see Perzanowski, supra note 124, at 537 (interpreting tattoo artists’ norms
to “embrace a more robust set of exhaustion rights favoring their clients”
instead of themselves).
155. See Cheryl Walker, Video Games and Realism: Communication
Professor Studies Effects on Children, WAKE FOREST UNIV. (Dec. 22, 2010),
http://news.wfu.edu/2010/12/22/video-games-and-realism/ (last visited Nov. 6,
2015) (noting that “with these games, the enhanced realism also makes the
player feel more involved in the game and increases the effect” of actual
involvement, which continues as a popular trait of video games) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
156. See King, supra note 11, at 161 (encouraging artists to enforce their
rights but ignoring the rights of the “younger generation,” which acquires more
tattoos than any other before it).
157. See supra Part IV (outlining the variety of suggestions that scholars
created to solve the tattoo and copyright dilemma and pointing out each theory’s
weak spot as it related to the player, the artist, or the video game).
158. See IOANNIS G. DIMITRAKOPOULOS, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: THE CASE LAW OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 331
(2007) (recognizing that certain matters involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make obtain constitutional recognition through
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). The author goes further by identifying
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scholars and lawyers quickly agree that tattoos deserve copyright
protection, they also recognize that the “potential for an artist to
control a person’s public appearances and activities is all too
harmful to the ideals of individual autonomy and freedom.” 159
Without a harsh deviation from previously suggested solutions,
“[c]opyright law thereby becomes the instrument to impose,
almost literally, a badge of involuntary servitude, akin to the
mark which ranchers brand the cattle they own” onto the
recipient of a tattoo. 160 Withholding tattoo artists’ copyright
protection for nonfeatured uses of their works only occurs if a
client cannot successfully rely on other defenses and if the client
failed to obtain a release prior to getting inked.
Nimmer recently voiced his support of this conclusion in a
memorandum he wrote for Warner Brothers in Whitmill,
admitting that he “tacitly assumed that a tattoo could
‘presumably qualify as a work of graphic art’” before taking the
case. 161 His memorandum, however, depicts a drastic departure
from his previously held beliefs. 162 To illustrate this shift,
Nimmer used the example of Mike Tyson’s face tattoo to
demonstrate the absurdity of granting Whitmill exclusive rights
under the Act for the copyrighted work:
[T]he consequences of recognizing copyright protection for a
tattoo include the possibility that a court could order the
bearer not to remove it, if it has gained recognized stature; or
to order the bearer to undergo laser removal, if he has added
an additional tattoo adjacent to it; or to prevent magazine,
television, and film coverage of the bearer with the tattoo on

privacy and personal autonomy over one’s self as “the most comprehensive of
rights and the right[s] most valued by civilized men.” Id. at 333; see also
Perzanowski, supra note 124, at 532 (recognizing that without tattooers’ respect
for client autonomy, clients legally have little protection against the artist).
159. See Cummings, supra note 27, at 309 (arguing first for the
copyrightability of tattoos and then addressing display rights and control over
the client as separate issues).
160. Heitner & Wilmot, supra note 6, at 315.
161. See Nimmer Declaration, supra note 32, at 2, 4 (submitting a statement
on behalf of Warner Brothers discussing his changed views on tattoos and their
copyrightability).
162. See id. at 4 (changing his position regarding the copyrightability of
tattoos).
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his face. Further . . . there is no possible way for the bearer of
the tattoo to protect herself against those consequences. 163

Clearly, the interest in protecting intellectual property rights
cannot outweigh the immense authority favoring the bearer’s
personal autonomy, as Nimmer suggested in support of Warner
Brothers. 164
2. Considerations When Crafting a New Test
A new, workable test for copyright infringement and tattoos
must include considerations and components that correct the
current suggestions’ weaknesses. 165 First, the test must apply
specifically to the tattoo context, recognizing the competing rights
of artists and clients, as well as the real life ramifications
associated with getting a tattoo. 166 Second, courts must possess
the ability to consistently apply the new test to give artists,
clients, and video games a clearer standard to rely on in the
future. 167 Finally, the new test must encompass the video game
163. Id. at 13.
164. See id. at 8 (“For all these reasons, human flesh cannot serve as the
‘medium of expression’ that Congress intended to embody legally protectable
authorship. For that reason, plaintiff’s claim of copyright over a tattoo on Mike
Tyson’s body must be summarily rejected.”).
165. See supra Part III (criticizing all the authorities’ suggestions for
resolution of the issue of tattoos and copyright). Notice that the authorities all
rely on exceptions to the exclusive rights of the artist instead of recognizing the
equal importance of the separate and distinct rights of the client. See id. (listing
fair use, joint works, work made for hire, and implied nonexclusive licenses as
the proposed solutions for copyright disputes between clients and artists, all of
which carve back at the artists’ exclusive rights but refuse to identify clients’
rights).
166. See David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and
Originality, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 29 (2001) (recognizing the conundrum of the
copyrightability of someone’s body but struggling to provide evidence to support
the claim, and instead stating “apodictically that a body, even as augmented,
simply is not subject to copyright protection”).
167. See King, supra note 11, at 133 (aiming to “address the ambiguity
regarding the protectability of tattoos due to the lack of published court
decisions in this area of the law, and [identifying] the negative impact such
ambiguity has on the tattoo industry”); Symposium, International Summit on
the Law and Business of Video Games: Legal Threats to Game Developers, 16
SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 99, 115 (2013) (capturing the response of the senior
director of intellectual property at EA Sports to a question regarding copyright
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industry while also having wider applications for tattoos in
general. 168
3. The Featured Use Test
In prioritizing players’ rights to live their lives without the
concern of copyright infringement lawsuits, artists’ rights cannot
disappear altogether. 169 This Note proposes a new test to
determine which uses of artists’ copyrighted works garner legal
protection. The featured use test depends upon the nature of the
allegedly infringing activity; if use of the artist’s tattoo qualifies
as featured, the violating parties cannot disclaim liability. 170
The featured use test dictates that incidental, nonfeatured
uses of a tattoo will not violate the artist’s rights, but when a
party consciously chooses to feature an artist’s tattoo in a place of
prominence, the party’s use triggers the artist’s exclusive rights.
For example, an advertisement prominently featuring an artist’s
tattoo will always meet the featured use test because of the
inherent purpose of advertising—to catch the audience’s
attention. 171 The test honors the constitutional commitment to
liability). The EA representative indicated that EA goes through an extensive
legal process before developing a video game, which she indicated “kept [EA] out
of trouble, basically.” See id. (describing EA’s development process for a video
game as involving extensive copyright, trademark, and copying analysis).
168. See generally Rice, supra note 153 (advocating for a different set of
rules for the video game industry, due to its unique and technologically
progressive nature).
169. See King, supra note 11, at 132 (categorizing tattoo artists as a group
that needs more protection under the law, especially because “no tattoo artist
has yet been successful in receiving enforcement by the court of his copyright in
a tattoo”).
170. See Heitner & Wilmot, supra note 6, at 318 (recognizing, timidly, the
important differentiation between incidental use and purposeful use of the
tattoo). “However, the inherent problem remains in determining whether the
artist should benefit from any incidental use of the tattoo in a commercial
setting . . . or if his commission should strictly stem from purposeful use of the
tattoo . . . .” Id.
171. See infra notes 188–195 and accompanying text (explaining why Reed
and Whitmill both clearly fit within the featured use test); Lorillard Tobacco Co.
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 578 (2001) (discussing the purposes of advertising, which
include promoting a product and obtaining the target audience’s attention to sell
that product); see also Harkins, supra note 60, at 332 (explaining that tattoo lore
involves artists protecting their work but not favoring featured exposure of their
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personal autonomy by eliminating liability for otherwise
infringing acts associated with ordinary living. 172 For a
professional football player, incidental, nonfeatured uses of his
tattoo include inadvertent displays at public events, during game
broadcasts and newscasts, and even avatar appearances in video
games—activities associated with the player’s lifestyle and
career. 173 Alternatively, featured uses of a player’s tattoo—
including purposeful uses in commercials, photographs, and other
advertising materials—would violate the artist’s exclusive
rights. 174 Support for the rationale of the featured use test comes
from a variety of sources.
First, the lexicology behind the word “featured” illustrates its
appropriateness in this context. The Oxford English Dictionary
defines “featured” as “made a feature or special attraction” and
defines its synonym “prominent” as “stand[ing] out so as to catch
the attention; notable.” 175 Similarly, the U.S. Department of
Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles identifies a “featured
player” as one who “receives prominent billing.” 176 The Supreme
Court has used “featured” to mean prominence as well, indicating
its familiarity with the term. 177 The Copyright Act also uses the
work in advertisements).
172. See supra Part V.A (ordering the various competing rights at issue in
the copyrightability of tattoos and concluding that personal autonomy trumps
creative protections).
173. See GEORGE W. SCHUBERT, RODNEY K. SMITH & JESSE C. TRENTADUE,
SPORTS LAW 126 (1986) (historicizing the increased “popularity of sporting
activities and the athletes who participate in them” and pointing out the
importance of advertising and related commercial activities for the sports
business).
174. See infra notes 188–202 and accompanying text (exploring Reed,
Whitmill, and Allen as examples of when featured uses of an artist’s tattoo in
promotional materials constituted violations of the artist’s exclusive rights
under the Copyright Act).
175. See 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 791 (2d ed. 1989) (listing a variety of
definitions for “featured,” more typically used to describe someone’s
appearance); 12 id. at 613 (defining “prominence” as “[s]tanding out so as to
strike the eye; conspicuous”).
176. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES 159.047-018
(4th ed., rev. 1991).
177. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 689 (2005) (discussing the
eminence of Moses and the Ten Commandments in the District of Columbia,
including a statue “prominently featured in the Chamber of the United States
House of Representatives”); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,

WHO HAS THE MOST SKIN IN THE GAME?

1983

word to differentiate between various royalty rates. 178 The Act
defines “featured music” as “any performance of a musical work,
whether live or recorded, that is the principal focus of audience
attention,” the same concept this Note uses to define the featured
use test. 179
Second, the Second Circuit created a similar test when
analyzing whether the inclusion of art behind the scenes in
television shows and films constituted copyright infringement or
de minimis fair use. 180 The court focused on the “observability of
the copyrighted work in the allegedly infringing work” and the
“prominence” of the copyrighted work in the film or show. 181 The
Second Circuit used this analysis in the context of artwork in
films and television shows, but the distinction between
out-of-focus, background use and lengthy, prominent, observable
use analogizes nicely to this new test regarding tattoos and
copyright. 182 Due to the courts’ and the government’s familiarity

471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (noting that although infringing material constituted
less than one percent of the work, the infringing material was “prominently
featured” and therefore violated the author’s exclusive rights); United States v.
First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 536 n.12 (1965) (using the turn of phrase
“prominently featured” to indicate the position of preference of a theory in a
petition for rehearing).
178. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 381.6(b)(1), 253.8(b)(1)(ii)(2)
(2012) (using “featured” to describe certain displays that warrant higher royalty
rates).
179. See id. § 381.6(b)(1) (distinguishing featured music from nonfeatured
music, which includes incidental performances).
180. See Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir.
1998) (reviewing a video copy of defendant’s movie to determine if the movie met
the quantitative threshold for copyright infringement); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t
Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997) (“What defendants dispute when
they assert that their use of the poster was de minimis is whether the admitted
copying occurred to an extent sufficient to constitute actionable copying, i.e.,
infringement.”).
181. See Sandoval, 147 F.3d at 217 (“Observability is determined by the
length of time the copyrighted work appears in the allegedly infringing work,
and its prominence in that work . . . .”); Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 75 (listing the
length of time that the copied work is observable in the allegedly infringing
work and the prominence of its inclusion as factors to consider when
determining infringement).
182. See supra note 181 (describing the two cases in which the Second
Circuit has relied on the distinction between background use and featured use
to determine if an activity qualified as a fair, de minimis use).
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with the term “featured” as meaning prominent, its use in this
new test is appropriate. 183
Third, the player’s right of publicity bolsters the validity of
the featured use test. The right of publicity protects celebrities’
ability to profit from their own identities and personas. 184 As soon
as the ink dries, a tattoo becomes a permanent part of a client’s
identity and persona, automatically incorporating into that
player’s right of publicity. 185 Any uses of the tattoo incidental to
the client’s identity therefore warrant right of publicity
protection, which permits the client to require consent before any
profits resulting from use of his likeness and image. 186 Featured
uses surpass right-of-publicity protection, however, as they no
longer merely accompany the client’s identity but become the
“principal focus of the audience[’s] attention.” 187
183. See supra notes 176–177 and accompanying text (sourcing definitions of
“featured” from legal authorities to determine its appropriateness in this Note’s
new standard for determining copyright infringement associated with tattoos);
see also Rodney Distribs., Inc., 50 F.T.C. 11, 12 (1953) (accusing the corporation
and its officers of misrepresenting the manufacturing location of their product
by “featured use” of domestic names on the product); Nat’l Stores, 49 F.T.C.
1450, 1451 (1953) (alleging that the corporation falsely advertised that it
produced its machines domestically by featuring domestic brand names on the
machines); Del Mar Sewing Mach. Co., 49 F.T.C. 1257, 1258 (1953)
(representing “through the featured use of the words ‘Universal,’ ‘Majestic’ and
other well known domestic trade or brand names” that the product remained
connected to well known domestic firms); Merlino v. Schmetz, 20 A.2d 266, 267
(R.I. 1941) (detailing plaintiff’s allegations as contending that the defendant’s
“featured use of these words, in the peculiar setting and circumstances”
amounted to unfair competition).
184. See Rice, supra note 153, at 324–26 (defining the right of publicity
using the Haelan court’s rationale and Nimmer’s article entitled The Right of
Publicity).
185. See Heitner & Wilmot, supra note 6, at 319 (noting ambiguity
surrounding the intersection of copyright law, tattoos, and the right of publicity
but rightfully characterizing a tattoo as part of a client’s “image and likeness”).
186. See Rice, supra note 153, at 324 (distinguishing the right of publicity
from the right to privacy but emphasizing that the moral right theory of the
right of publicity does give a player the right to choose what video games to
appear in).
187. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 381.6(b)(1) (2012) (describing
“featured music” for the purposes of determining royalty rates for using
another’s copyrighted musical work); see also Heitner & Wilmot, supra note 6, at
319 (“Further, allowing tattoo artists to sue athletes as part of their copyright
infringement claims would seem to run contrary to the purpose of the right of
publicity.”).
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Last, two of the prominent cases analyzed in Part III clearly
illustrate the value of the featured use test. In Reed, tattoo artist
Reed acknowledged his desire for Wallace, the tattoo recipient, to
violate Reed’s exclusive rights with nonfeatured uses of his
tattoo, uses associated with Wallace’s career as an NBA
basketball player. 188 In his Complaint, Reed distinguished
between featured and nonfeatured uses, too, stating, “Plaintiff is
entitled to share in any revenue realized by Mr. Wallace as the
result of any use, other than an incidental use, of the tattoo.” 189
Only after Reed became aware that “the tattoo he had applied to
Mr. Wallace’s arm was being featured as part of an advertising
campaign” did he institute an infringement suit against both
Wallace and Nike. 190
Whitmill presents the same situation, with a slight twist on
the facts. 191 In Whitmill, Warner Brothers chose to feature a copy
of Mike Tyson’s tattoo on another person altogether, clearly
leaving the incidental-use realm by putting a replica of the tattoo
on the face of an actor in the film. 192 The plaintiff artist never
objected to uses of the tattoo associated with Mike Tyson’s
lifestyle, which included broadcasted boxing matches, movie
appearances, and others. 193 In fact, Tyson appeared in the series’
first installment, The Hangover, without any objection from
188. See Nike Complaint, supra note 14, at 4 (“Mr. Reed observed the tattoo
during televised NBA games in which Mr. Wallace participated as a player. Mr.
Reed expected that public display of the tattoo . . . .”). Reed considered such
exposure both common and desirable in the tattoo industry. See id. (describing
Reed’s positive feelings toward the incidental uses of Wallace’s tattoo during
NBA broadcasts).
189. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
190. See id. (describing how the commercial “features the tattoo filling the
screen in a close up,” which ultimately led Reed to file suit) (emphasis added);
see also robjv1, supra note 51 (depicting the commercial at issue in the case).
191. See Warner Brothers Complaint, supra note 15, at 4 (differing from
Reed in that the infringer did not feature the tattoo as seen on the original
recipient, Mike Tyson, but on someone else altogether).
192. See id. (recounting how “the Movie features a virtually exact
reproduction of the Original Tattoo, which appears on the upper left side of the
Stu Price Character’s face, played by actor Ed Helms”).
193. See About Mike Tyson, MIKE TYSON, http://www.miketyson.com/about
(last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (retelling Tyson’s immense career, which included
multiple televised boxing matches, magazine articles featuring Tyson, and
cameo appearances in movies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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Whitmill. 194 The sequel’s use of the tattoo in its advertising and
plot line, however, quickly became a featured use, and only at the
occurrence of this use did the artist instigate copyright
infringement actions against Warner Brothers. 195
The application of the featured use test to Allen becomes
slightly more nuanced. Like Reed and Whitmill, Allen’s
Complaint admitted, “Defendant Ricky Williams was known to
plaintiff as a professional football player, and [plaintiff] assumed
he would see his art on television.” 196 Allen also recognized that
EA Sports chose to feature “defendant Ricky Williams and the
tattoo art,” which at first glance appears as a use incidental to
selecting Williams as the athlete to adorn the cover of the video
games. 197 Allen’s Complaint, however, explicitly recognizes the
difference between featured uses on the covers of the games and
Williams’s other “incidental use[s]” of the tattoo. 198
An empirical analysis supports the same conclusion
regarding the covers of the popular video games. 199 Each cover
includes only an avatar of Williams, but each avatar’s placement
emphasizes Williams’s tattoos, transitioning the use from
nonfeatured to featured. 200 Additionally, EA Sports used the
tattoo to advertise the game, just like Warner Brothers’ movie
posters for The Hangover: Part II and Nike’s commercial
featuring Wallace’s tattoos. 201 Advertisements intentionally grab
194. See Warner Brothers Hearing, supra note 72, at 2 (observing that the
first movie only showed Mr. Tyson’s face, to which Whitmill did not object, but
that the second movie used the tattoo on another character’s face). Without
objection from Whitmill, Mr. Tyson also played a minor role in the sequel. Id.
195. See Warner Brothers Complaint, supra note 15, at 5 (“The Pirated
Tattoo is prominently featured in the marketing and promotional materials for
the Movie . . . .”).
196. Electronic Arts Complaint, supra note 16, at 3.
197. See id. at Exhibits 2–3 (featuring Ricky Williams on the cover of NFL
Street and Madden NFL 10 and 11) (emphasis added).
198. See id. at 7 (requesting “[a]n accounting of the revenue realized by Mr.
Williams as the result of any use, other than an incidental use, of the tattoo”
(emphasis added)).
199. See id. at Exhibit 2 (positioning Williams’s body on the cover of the
game so that his tattooed bicep becomes the focal point of the audience’s
attention).
200. See id. (placing Williams on the cover in a manner that emphasizes his
tattoos, not just his person).
201. Compare id. at 5 (seeking damages according to EA Sports’ profits from
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the attention of the audience by prominently featuring certain
material and almost always result in featured, infringing uses of
the tattoo artist’s copyrighted tattoo. 202
VI. Conclusion
The state of the law regarding the copyrightability of tattoos
demands a new and innovative approach. 203 No court has spoken
definitively on the matter, and the utter lack of precedent creates
confusion for artists, players, and sports industries alike. 204
Scholars attempted to resolve the problem with legally
impractical answers—defenses that no client or video game could
ever successfully plead. 205 Left with no common law or scholarly
authority to rely on, the featured use test emerges as the fourth
quarter Hail Mary that this predicament desperately needs. 206
The featured use test harmonizes the competing interests of
the player, the artist, and the video game and presents each
constituency with a predictable, workable answer to their
respective copyright concerns. 207 The test allows video games to
include players’ body art in nonfeatured, less noticeable ways
featuring plaintiff’s work on the cover of its highly successful games), with
Warner Brothers Complaint, supra note 15, at 5 (emphasizing that Warner
Brothers featured the infringing version of the tattoo to market and promote the
film), and Nike Complaint, supra note 14, at 4 (objecting to Wallace and Nike
creating a commercial that featured Reed’s tattoo art without his permission).
202. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose of
advertisements and how they inherently become featured uses of an artist’s
work due to their nature).
203. See Perzanowski, supra note 124, at 514 (observing that the law
surrounding the tattoo industry must account for “a more complex set of
relationships” than other intersections with copyright law).
204. See Warner Brothers Hearing, supra note 72, at 2 (addressing orally
the merits of plaintiff’s copyright infringement case against Warner Brothers
and evaluating Warner Brothers’ defenses against the suit).
205. See supra Part IV (identifying the four most commonly suggested
resolutions by other scholars and critiquing them for their lack of practicality for
defendants).
206. See supra Part V (announcing the featured use test and describing its
timeliness and usefulness).
207. See supra notes 152–157 and accompanying text (cataloging the
interests of the different parties involved in copyrighting tattoos and concluding
that not all interests can prevail simultaneously).
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without fearing a lawsuit, while simultaneously protecting tattoo
artists from exploitative featured uses of their original art. Most
importantly, the featured use test removes any doubt about the
player’s personal autonomy over his lifestyle and career. Courts
should adopt this standard while they have the requisite
discretion, as the issue remains one of first impression. 208

208. See Heitner & Wilmot, supra note 6, at 317 (“[U]ntil a case produces a
direct order stating how copyright right [sic] law shall apply, all other views are
seen as merely dicta for courts to adopt at their discretion.”).

